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This study examines the relationship between sponsor ownership and firm performance proxied 
by firm value, operating cash flow, and dividend policy with Asian real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) in Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore for the period from 2002 to 2012, 
focusing on both the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. Our study sheds 
new light on effective corporate governance for Asian REITs that are prone to agency problems. 
Such agency problems arise from the inequitable distribution of power to sponsors that results 
from the external management structure. The findings suggest that larger sponsor ownership 
aligns the interests of sponsors and minority shareholders and enhances the performance of 
Asian REITs, while such an effect diminishes as sponsors become more entrenched. We find 
that the incentive alignment effect and entrenchment effect are primarily driven by developer-
sponsored REITs. Also evident is that the presence of institutional investors mitigates agency 
problems and increases firm performance. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) in Asian countries are structured as “captive REITs,” 
managed by external asset management companies that are wholly or partially owned by the 
sponsors (see Figure 1 for details). Most sponsors of Asian REITs are banks or developers 
holding large portfolios of illiquid investment-grade real estate. Such sponsors use the REIT 
structure to offload properties during initial public offerings (IPOs). Therefore, the sponsor can 
significantly influence Asian REITs’ investment policies and operations because the sponsor 
has control over the asset managers and the board of trustees; this creates conflicts of interest 
between the sponsor/manager and the shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen, 1986; 
Morck et al., 1988).  
The conflicts of interest result in agency problems, as evidenced by some of related 
party property transactions1 (RPTs) and financing activities between sponsors and their REITs 
(Hsieh and Sirmans, 1991; Ooi, Ong, and Neo, 2011). Sponsors, who own and control REIT 
advisors, act as both sellers and buyers in these transactions, raising concerns over the price 
paid for and the quality2 of such transactions (CFA, 2011; RiskMetrics, 2009). As summarized 
in Appendix A, REITs pay more for properties acquired from their sponsors than they would 
pay for properties acquired from independent third parties (Fortune REIT; FC Residential 
Investment Corporation; Keppel REIT) and REITs involve financing activities favorable to 
sponsors (MacArthurCook REIT; Mori Hills REIT). In fact, studies that have focused on 
                                                          
1 In their study on property transactions made by Japan and Singapore REITs from 2002 through 2007, Ooi et al. 
(2011) observe that almost one third of all the property transactions are related party acquisitions with the 
sponsors. 
2 Sponsors also have a tendency to keep their “trophy assets” in their portfolio while disposing of smaller 
properties into the REITs. In their research report, RREEF (2012) illustrates that J-REIT sponsors tend to only 
feed smaller properties into their REITs. While the average total assets hold by J-REITs is approximately JPY 
111 billion in 2011, about 50 buildings in Japan alone are worth as much as the entire REIT portfolio. 
   3 
 
externally managed US REITs (Hsieh and Sirmans, 1991; Cannon and Vogt, 1995; Capozza 
and Seguin, 2000) suggest that sponsors benefit from these related party transactions and 
REITs are merely divestment vehicles for illiquid investment-grade real estate, allowing 
sponsors to recycle capital efficiently. Figure 2 shows that sponsors gradually offload their 
shareholdings as their REITs get older. 
Being inherently vulnerable to agency problems largely due to the unique external 
management style, Asian REITs must seek ways to mitigate agency problems to increase firm 
value. One notable solution is through the management of ownership structure, especially 
equity ownership by sponsors (sponsor ownership). Jensen and Mackling’s (1976) model 
predicts that large managerial shareholdings result in higher firm value because it allows 
managers’ interests and incentives to be closely aligned with those of outside shareholders 
(incentive alignment effect). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988) show that 
the firm’s value increases only until a certain point, after which managers become entrenched 
and pursue private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders (entrenchment effect).  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether and how sponsor ownership interacts 
with agency problems prevalent in Asian REITs and affects firm performance. Specifically, we 
examine the effects of sponsor ownership on REIT firm value (Tobin’s Q), operating 
performance (FFO/Total Assets), and dividend policy (Dividend Yield and Dividend Payout), 
while considering both the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. We further 
hypothesize that the effect of sponsor ownership on performance measures can be influenced 
by sponsor type (banks and developers). Developer sponsors,3 which tend to conduct more 
frequent related party property transactions with their REITs (Wong et al., 2013), have more 
opportunities to consume perquisites or enhance their REITs’ growth opportunities with 
property pipeline support. Similarly, while the strong banking relationships with bank sponsors 
                                                          
3 Approximately 77% of all the related party property transactions in Japan and Singapore REITs from 2003-2011 
are made between developer sponsors and their REITs.  
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can ensure access to bank debt and enhance REITs’ growth opportunities, the lack of real estate 
expertise of bank sponsors (property pipeline support) could negatively affect operating 
performance. We also examine whether governance mechanism affects agency problems of 
Asian REITs or firm performance because Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), Han (2006), and 
Hartzell et al. (2006) provide some evidence of effects of governance mechanism on agency 
issues among US REITs.  
While the literature on corporate governance in Asian REITs remains fairly thin, the 
unique environment of Asian REIT markets where all REITs are externally managed warrants 
understanding the role of sponsor ownership in relation to prevailing agency issues. This study 
contributes to the existing literature by deepening an understanding of effective corporate 
governance for Asian REITs. 
We find a significant positive effect of sponsor ownership on firm value and operating 
cash flows, which diminishes as sponsor ownership further increases. This finding is consistent 
with the incentive alignment hypothesis, whereby larger sponsor shareholdings align the 
interests of sponsors with those of minority shareholders and, thus, enhance REIT performance. 
The non-linearity of the effect suggests the existence of the entrenchment effect. We also find 
a negative non-linear relationship between sponsor ownership and dividend policy, suggesting 
that committed sponsors are long-term investors, retaining cash for future growth opportunities 
instead of distributing it to enhance personal wealth. Different governance mechanisms, with 
the exception of institutional investors, have weak impacts on REIT performance. The results 
further show that incentive alignment effects are driven by developer sponsors. Specifically, 
higher firm valuation for developer-sponsored REITs can stem from either enhanced growth 
opportunities from lower dividend payments or improved operating cash flows caused by the 
increasing sponsor shareholdings. Major results remain robust even after controlling for 
endogeneity between sponsor ownership and firm value. 
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the previous 
studies relevant to this study. The data and methodology we employ in this study are detailed 
in the subsequent section followed by discussion of descriptive statistics and regression results. 
The final section concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The separation of ownership and control exacerbates agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932) 
as managers can act against the interests of shareholders, through either empire building 
(Jensen, 1986) or consumption of perquisites (Morck et al., 1988). However, studies (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1983; 1985) also show that managerial shareholdings should have no relationship 
with firm performance as both managerial holdings and firm performance are endogenously 
determined by changes in the firm’s contracting environment. Thus, the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance remains an empirical puzzle that stimulated the 
examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value with REITs that 
are more prone to agency issues. Agency issues with REITs arise from unique regulations 
(Friday et al., 1999; Han, 2006) or the weak disciplining mechanisms relative to general 
corporations (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2006). 
The REIT literature on the topic has provided mixed results using different measures 
of firm performance, including firm value (Friday et al., 1999; Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Han, 
2006, Hartzell et al., 2006), operating performance (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003; Capozza and 
Seguin, 2003), and risk-taking behavior (Dolde and Knopf, 2010). While some studies report 
a linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, providing evidence 
for the incentive alignment effect (Cappoza and Seguin, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2006), others 
document a diminishing effect of managerial ownership on firm performance, suggesting the 
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existence of the entrenchment effect (Friday et al., 1999; Han, 2006). Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) 
find that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance with REITs 
becomes insignificant after controlling for alternative governance mechanisms and 
endogeneity between managerial ownership and firm performance. Further investigations 
reveal that the incentive alignment effect is evident because increased managerial ownership 
results in improved cash flow and lower managerial expense (Cappoza and Seguin, 2003). 
However, when managerial ownership is too high, REIT managers tend to undertake less risk 
(Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Dolde and Knopf, 2010) and invest in inferior opportunities 
(Hartzell et al., 2006), which provides evidence for the entrenchment effect with REITs.  
Our choice of dividend policy as one of firm performance measures is motivated by 
findings in the REIT literature. For example, Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) illustrate how 
firms with a good track record, measured by return on assets, can convince shareholders of 
accepting lower dividend payouts. Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) investigate the impact of the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and board of directors on dividend payout and find that CEOs, 
who retain larger shareholdings, pay lower dividends, suggesting that, when investors believe 
that committed and aligned CEOs work as custodians and are concerned about long-term 
growth opportunities, they require less distribution. Therefore, we hypothesize that larger 
sponsor ownership should be associated with lower dividend payout as an evidence of 
mitigated agency problems.  
Governance mechanisms seem to affect REIT performance. Specifically, Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2003) report that superior monitoring from outside directors and block holders can 
enhance performance. Han (2006) further illustrates that the capacity for managers to consume 
perquisites at high managerial ownership levels is nullified by the presence of institutional 
monitoring. Hartzell et al. (2006) demonstrate that institutional investors’ involvement ensures 
that REIT managers invest responsibly. Therefore, we incorporate alternative governance 
mechanisms to examine the effect of sponsor ownership on firm performance.  
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The literature on corporate governance of Asian REITs is still fairly limited. Wong et 
al. (2013) illustrate that commitment from sponsors and institutional investors is correlated 
with superior performance during IPOs, suggesting that a stronger sponsor presence confers 
certification benefits. Kudus and Sing (2011) show that stock returns of Asian REITs with large 
sponsor shareholdings are higher than those of REITs with weak controlling sponsor 
shareholdings for the period from 2003 through 2007. Using a corporate governance scoring 
framework developed by the Asia Pacific Real Estate Association, Lecomte and Ooi (2013) 
illustrate that REITs with stronger corporate governance do not outperform operationally, 
while their risk-adjusted returns are much higher than those for REITs with weaker corporate 
governance.        
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
Data 
Our sample consists of 69 REITs4 from Japan5 (31), Hong Kong (7), Malaysia (11), and 
Singapore (22) for the period from 2002 through 2012. For this unbalanced panel of REITs, 
we collect the following information: the percentages of shares owned by sponsors (SPOWN), 
external block holders (BLOCKOWN), and institutional owners (INSTIOWN), board 
independence (OUTBOD), and board size (BODSize). We rely on the bi-annual financial 
statements provided by each REIT for information on sponsor, block ownership, and board 
                                                          
4 Other REIT markets are not chosen either due to data unavailability or immaturity of markets. 
5 For J-REITs, there may be multiple sponsors. We choose the one that owns the management team of the REIT 
to identify a single sponsor for each J-REIT. 
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structures. Information on institutional owners is taken from the SNL REIT Database and 
missing data6 are supplemented with the Factset Database.  
Firm-specific characteristics such as leverage ratio (Leverage), stock price volatility 
(Sigma), firm size (Size), firm value (Tobin’s Q), age of REIT (REITAge), dividend yield 
(DIVYIELD), operating cash flows (FFO/TotalAsset ), return on assets (ROA), and asset growth 
(Assetgrowth) are collected from Datastream. Details on sponsor characteristics, such as 
sponsor type (Dev_SP, Bank_SP, Others), sponsor age (SPAge), listing status (SPListed), and 
number of REIT spin-offs from sponsors (LN_Spinoffs) are collected from the corporate 
website of each sponsor. In total, we capture 716 bi-annual observations (403 from J-REITs, 
64 from M-REITs, 56 from HK-REITs, 193 from S-REITs). Missing observations of 
independent variables further reduce our sample size up to 651.  
 
Sponsor Ownership, Firm Value, and Operating Performance 
Our measure for REIT firm value is Tobin’s Q, defined as the sum of market value of equity, 
the market value of preferred stock, and book value of long- and short-term debt divided by 
the book value of total assets (Perfect and Wiles, 1994). Tobin’s Q has been widely used as a 
measure of firm value;7 it is a valid measure of firm value especially for Asian REITs because 
properties held by REITs are appraised and their book values are updated semi-annually. We 
use funds from operations scaled by total assets (FFO/TotalAsset) as our measure of operating 
performance. This measure is superior to other performance measures (Vincent, 1999; Downs 
and Guner, 2006) for REITs. 
                                                          
6 The SNL REIT database does not have institutional holdings for REITs in Malaysia. We supplement the missing 
observations with data from Factset. 
7 See Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Han (2006). 
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Our key independent variable is sponsor ownership (SPOWN), which is defined as the 
total shareholdings held by the sponsor firm and all its related companies divided by the number 
of shares outstanding of each REIT. To capture the non-linear relationship between sponsor 
holdings and firm value, we specify quadratic specification by including a squared term for 
sponsor ownership variable (SPOWNsq).  
We further specify alternative governance mechanisms by six variables. Given that firm 
value is higher in firms with stronger boards (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003), stronger monitoring 
from institutional investors (Pound, 1988; Han, 2006), and external block holders (Kaplan and 
Minton, 1994), we use board size (BODSize), board independence (OUTBOD), institutional 
ownership (INSTIOWN), and outside block ownership (BLOCKOWN).  
Leverage (Leverage) is included as a control variable as debt holders are superior 
monitors that can alleviate agency problems due to their ability to collect information and 
screen a firm during lending activities (Diamond, 1984). Future growth opportunities of a REIT 
are likely to be reflected in Tobin’s Q. Therefore, we include firm size (Size) as a control as 
larger REITs find it increasingly difficult to make yield accretive acquisitions (Ooi et al., 2011). 
Asset growth (Assetgrowth) is included to control for growth opportunities (Han, 2006). While 
we measure operating cash flows using FFO/TotalAsset, we account for the profitability of the 
REIT using the same variable for firm value specification because more profitable REITs are 
likely to be more highly valued by the market. Furthermore, we control for stock price volatility 
(Sigma) as it may induce concentrated managerial shareholdings due to greater scope of moral 
hazard (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
 
Sponsor Ownership and Dividend Policy 
   10 
 
Following Ghosh and Sirmans (2006), we measure the distribution of dividends using dividend 
yield (DIVYIELD), which is computed as the dividend per share divided by the price per share, 
and dividend payout (DIVPAY), which is computed as the total common dividends divided by 
net income. Our key independent variable is again sponsor ownership (SPOWN). A squared 
term for the sponsor ownership variable (SPOWNsq) is also included.  
To capture possible dividend smoothing from REIT managers, we include FFO (t-1) 
and changeFFO, defined as lagged funds from operations and change in funds from operations 
from the previous period, respectively. Following Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) and Ghosh 
and Sirmans (2006), we further control for performance ratios such as return on assets (ROA) 
and Tobin’s Q as proxies for investment opportunities. If shareholders use past performance as 
an indication of future growth prospects, we expect REITs with superior past performance to 
pay out lower amounts of dividends.  
We run pooled OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors for the 
main analyses where different firm performance measures become dependent variables and the 
percentages of shares owned by sponsors (SPOWN) and its squared term (SPOWNsq) are main 
independent variables along with relevant control variables. We also include sector dummies 
(Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office, and Diversified), time dummies (i.e. year fixed 
effect), and country dummies (Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore).8 
The descriptions of all the variables in our models are detailed in Table 1. 
 
                                                          
8 As a robustness check, we run regressions using alternative models; random-effect flexible generalized least 
squares with cluster-robust standard errors and fixed-effect least-squares dummy-variables regression with 
cluster-robust standard errors, using the dividend payout model as an example. The results summarized in 
Appendix C confirm that the main results are robust against the choice of different estimation methods. 
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IV. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of sponsor shareholdings in Asian and US REITs across the 
different ownership breakpoints. Asian sponsors, on average, retain about 23.3% of their REIT 
shareholdings, much larger than the 16.2% held by US REIT managers. Ninety percent of the 
sponsors in Asia retain more than 5% of their REIT shareholdings, with 39% of the sponsors 
holding more than 25% of their REIT shareholdings.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of major variables; 9  sponsor 
shareholdings, firm value, operating performance, and dividend policies for the full sample and 
sub-samples by country of origin and sponsor type. Malaysian sponsors retain the largest 
shareholdings (52%) while Japanese sponsors retain the fewest shareholdings (16%). 
Developer sponsors hold more shares (27%) than bank sponsors (15%) and other types of 
sponsors (20%). While REITs in Asia appear to be trading close to their net asset values (0.99), 
this is largely driven by Japanese REITs (1.05). Most of the REITs in other countries, especially 
Hong Kong (0.82), are undervalued. Operating cash flows are highest for Malaysian REITs 
(0.06) and lowest for Hong Kong REITs (0.03). Singapore REITs tend to have high dividends 
when compared to price per share (0.078%), although the payout ratio (0.46) is lower than that 
of Japanese REITs (0.89). 
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes statistics of sponsor characteristics, governance 
structures, and firm-specific characteristics of Asian REITs. Most of the REITs in Asia are 
backed by developers (68%) and banks (24%), suggesting the importance of the REIT as an 
                                                          
9 This descriptive statistics are based on the full sample of 716 REITs. Different models have slightly different 
sample sizes due to missing values of independent variables included. 
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exit vehicle for developers. Of the REITs in Asia, 15.0% are backed by government-linked 
companies. Most of the sponsors are also fairly reputable; 77.0% of them are listed. The 
presence of alternative governance mechanisms is much stronger in US REITs.10 Boards11 are 
reported to be larger (8.08) and more independent (65.5%) in US REITs than the comparatively 
smaller (5.39) and less independent boards in Asian REITs (58%). The smaller board size for 
Asian REITs is largely driven by Japanese REITs, which on average have fewer than four board 
members. Institutional monitoring is also stronger in US REITs with larger institutional 
shareholdings (45.0%) than Asian REITs (28.0%). The lack of ownership restrictions could 
explain the larger shareholdings held by external block shareholders in Asian REITs (10.0%) 
than US REITs (5.3%).      
As shown in Appendix B, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all major independent 
variables are smaller than 3 with the mean VIF of 1.46, suggesting that there is not any serious 
multi-collinearity issue among the variables. 
 
Tobin’s Q and Sponsor Ownership 
Table 3 reports the results of regressions that examine the relationship between sponsor 
ownership and Tobin’s Q. Results are shown for the entire sample and sub-samples based on 
sponsor type.12 All specifications include time and sector fixed effects (Hotel, Residential, 
                                                          
10 Figures of board size, independence, institutional ownership, and external block owner shareholdings are 
obtained from Hartzell et al. (2006). 
11 When we remove the J-REITs that have notably smaller board sizes, we document that the boards in Asian 
REITs are still smaller (7.52) than those in US-REITs. 
12 We show the results for REITs with banks sponsors and those with developer sponsors. There are REITs with 
other types of sponsors such as retail companies and railway companies. While the combined sample includes 
such REITs, the sample size of REITs with other types of sponsors is too small (around 50) for sub-sample 
regression analyses. 
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Retail, Office, Industrial, and Diversified) to avoid spurious correlations due to unobserved 
heterogeneity.13  
With the combined sample, consistent with the findings of Han (2006), we report a 
strongly significant non-linear relationship14 between sponsor shareholdings and REIT firm 
value. Other things being equal, Tobin’s Q increases by around 0.01 with every 1% increase in 
sponsor holdings (SPOWN), while this rate appears to decrease as sponsor shareholdings 
increase, as evident with the significant negative effect of the squared term of sponsor 
ownership variable (SPOWNsq). 15 The results suggest that large sponsor ownership induces 
sponsors to pursue wealth maximizing policies that increase REIT firm value (incentive 
alignment effect), but such an effect diminishes as sponsor ownership becomes even larger 
(entrenchment effect).  
Another notable finding is that higher firm value for REITs is associated with larger 
institutional shareholdings (INSTIOWN) similar to the findings reported in Pound (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). The results imply that the involvement of institutional 
investors mitigates agency issues for Asian REITs, resulting in higher firm value. 
We also find that older REITs (REITAge) are more highly valued by the market. This 
result suggests that more experienced asset managers may be more capable of creating wealth 
                                                          
13 We avoid using firm fixed effects because sponsor shareholdings change very slowly over time, meaning that 
any relationship between firm value and ownership is likely to be captured cross-sectionally. As a result, 
employing the firm fixed effect, which removes cross-sectional variation across data, is likely to obscure the 
relationship between sponsor shareholdings and firm value (Zhou, 2001).  
14 Concerned that this positive relationship could be driven by the sample of Malaysian REITs with concentrated 
shareholdings, we remove them from our analysis as a robustness check and find that our results remain the same. 
15 Following Morck et al. (1988) and Han (2006), we also conduct piecewise linear regressions with breakpoints 
at 5% and 25% and find an attenuation of incentive alignment effects as sponsor shareholdings increase beyond 
5%. This result, illustrating a possible trading off of incentive alignment and entrenchment effects, is consistent 
with the non-linear relationship reported in the quadratic specification. 
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for their shareholders. Our findings also indicate that larger REITs and REITs with higher stock 
volatility may have lesser future growth opportunities, as evident with the significant negative 
coefficient of Size and Sigma. 
We further stratify our sample based on the notion that the capacity to create or destroy 
shareholder wealth may differ across sponsor types. Our findings reveal that incentive 
alignment effect is stronger among developer-sponsored REITs than among bank-sponsored 
REITs. A negative non-linear association is driven mainly by bank-sponsored REITs. Such 
entrenchment effect is much weaker with developer-sponsored REITs. Higher firm valuation 
could stem from real estate expertise or enhanced growth opportunities from property pipeline 
support (Wong et al., 2013) of committed developer sponsors.  
 
Operating Performance and Sponsor Ownership 
To understand the mechanisms of how sponsors can create or destroy shareholder wealth, we 
further examine the impact of sponsor shareholdings on operating performance measured with 
FFO scaled by total assets. Results are reported in Table 4. 
Findings are similar to earlier findings for Tobin’s Q. A significant positive relationship 
is found between SPOWN and FFO/TotalAssets that diminishes as sponsors become more 
entrenched. To provide a sense of the magnitude of sponsor shareholdings in REIT cash flows, 
holding all things constant, a 10% increase in sponsor shareholdings correlates with a 0.014% 
increase in operating cash flows. The existence of external block holders (BLOCKOWN), one 
of the governance mechanisms, enhances operating cash flows. Stratified estimations 
according to sponsor type illustrate that incentive alignment effects are largely driven by 
developer sponsors. A 10% increase in sponsor shareholdings is associated with a 0.02% 
increase in operating cash flow. This result is consistent with the notion that real estate expertise 
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from developer sponsors enhances the quality of REIT management teams. Enhanced operating 
performance can arise from timely acquisitions of high-quality assets and superior asset 
management that reduces vacancy risk and improves rental income. The entrenchment effect 
is also observed among developer-sponsored REITs. Larger shareholdings held by bank 
sponsors, on the other hand, do not correlate with superior cash flows.  
 
Dividend Policy and Sponsor Ownership  
One way that sponsors can extract wealth from their REITs is through dividend distribution. 
Sponsors can choose to enhance personal wealth instead of retaining cash for future growth 
opportunities by distributing larger dividends. Therefore, in the spirit of Ghosh and Sirmans 
(2006), we examine the relationship between sponsor shareholdings and dividend distribution 
(dividend yield and dividend payout). Result are reported in Table 5.  
Similar to the findings of Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) for a sample of US REITs, we 
document a negative non-linear relationship between sponsor shareholdings and dividend 
yield16 with the combined sample that appears to diminish as sponsor shareholdings increase. 
Other things being equal, dividend yield will fall by 0.1% with every 1% increase in sponsor 
shareholdings. It appears that sponsors, instead of paying out more dividends to increase their 
personal wealth, exert a stronger effort to retain cash for future growth opportunities as their 
shareholdings increase. From a shareholders’ point of view, as sponsors retain more shares, 
shareholders consider sponsors to be custodians and may require smaller distributions. The 
                                                          
16 Other than examining total dividend distributions, following Hardin and Hill (2008), we compute excess 
dividends and examine the relationship with sponsor shareholdings. Our findings (available upon request) are 
fairly consistent with our results for dividend yield. A negative non-linear relationship is detected between sponsor 
shareholdings and excess dividends, indicating that committed sponsors pay out less in excess dividends to 
enhance future growth opportunities.  
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significant and positive coefficient of SPOWNSQ suggests possible entrenchment effects as 
sponsor shareholdings increase. Larger dividend distributions are therefore required to mitigate 
such agency problems. These findings, however, do not remain robust when we stratify our 
sample according to sponsor type and when we examine dividend payouts. 17  
The effects of alternative governance mechanisms on dividend policy are mixed when 
we compare our findings between dividend yield and payout. Results are stronger for dividend 
yield specification. In particular, we observe that the stronger presence of institutional investors 
(INSTIOWN) lowers dividend yields. This finding suggests that committed institutional 
investors (INSTIOWN) enhance monitoring and ameliorate agency concerns. Block holders 
(BLOCKOWN), however, appear to pressure REIT managers to distribute more cash to enhance 
personal wealth. 
We find that REITs with superior growth opportunities pay out fewer dividends, as 
evident with the negative coefficient of TobinsQ and Size. Supporting the notion that REITs 
with better performance are not required to compensate investors (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2006), 
we observe that REITs with higher ROA have lower dividend payouts. Unlike the findings 
reported in Bradley et al. (1998) and Hardin and Hill (2008) regarding US REITs, we do not 
observe that Asian REIT managers smooth their dividends to meet future expectations of 
dividend distributions. 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
                                                          
17 These effects are significant only with the combined sample, although the effects of the same directions are 
observed also with developer-sponsored REITs. We believe this is due mainly to the small sample sizes of sub-
samples.  
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As mentioned, one major concern when examining ownership and performance is that the two 
can be endogenously determined. Many studies have addressed this econometric problem using 
the simultaneous equation approach18 but, as highlighted by Himmelberg et al. (1999), it is 
often difficult to identify good instruments for ownership. In fact, widely used instruments like 
firm size (Size and Sizesq) and stock price volatility (Sigma) appear to be highly correlated with 
firm value, operating cash flows, and dividend distribution under a multivariate framework, 
which leads to questions about their validity as instruments (see results in Tables 3-5).  
Therefore, we specify a vector of sponsor characteristics as instruments for sponsor 
shareholdings. Certain sponsors like developer sponsors (Wong et al., 2013) and government-
linked sponsors (Mak et al., 2001) may subject their REITs to severe moral hazard issues and 
are required to hold more shareholdings to mitigate agency concerns. Based on this notion, we 
believe that sponsor types (Bank_SP, Dev_SP, GLC_SP) are valid instruments for sponsor 
shareholdings. We further hypothesize that the reputation of the sponsor can influence its 
capacity to retain its REIT shareholdings and we proxy for reputation using SPList, a binary 
variable that indicates whether the sponsor is listed, and SPAge, a continuous variable denoting 
the age of sponsor. We also account for the number of REITs spun off by sponsors (LN_spinoffs) 
as sponsors that are likely to influence sponsor shareholdings (see Table 1 for definition). 
Estimations between sponsor shareholdings and various performance metrics (firm value, 
operating cash flows, and dividend policy) using two-staged least squares are reported in Table 
6. 
Most of our findings remain robust after controlling for endogeneity between sponsor 
shareholdings and performance. A robust positive (negative) nonlinear relation is detected 
between sponsor shareholdings and firm value (dividend yield), respectively. The relationship 
                                                          
18 See Himmelberg et al. (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), and Han (2006) for 
more details. 
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between sponsor shareholdings and operating performance, however, becomes insignificant 
when estimated using 2SLS. We further confirm the effectiveness of institutional investors in 
mitigating agency problems, reducing the need to distribute dividends, and enhancing REIT 
firm value. Post estimation results validate the quality of the instrument variables. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the relationship between sponsor holdings and firm value using cross-
country panel data that consist of 69 REITs listed in Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and 
Singapore for the period from 2002 through 2012. This study is motivated by the prevalence 
of agency issues in Asian REITs where sponsors are documented to expropriate their REITs 
from inequitable financing and related party property transactions. Concerns are raised whether 
sponsor shareholdings and governance mechanisms are sufficiently strong to mitigate the 
possible conflicts of interest between sponsors and minority shareholders in Asian REITs. 
Our empirical findings confirm that larger sponsor shareholdings serve to align the 
interests of sponsors with minority shareholders and encourage them to pursue wealth-
maximizing investment and financing decisions, while entrenched sponsor ownership 
diminishes such an incentive alignment effect, as evident with the positive non-linear 
relationship between sponsor ownership and REIT firm value. Consistent results surrounding 
operating cash flows and sponsor shareholdings imply that higher firm value surrounding 
REITs with committed sponsors could stem from superior cash flows. Lower dividend payouts 
for REITs with higher sponsor shareholdings suggest that committed sponsors are more 
concerned about retaining cash for future growth opportunities than enhancing personal wealth 
with larger dividend payouts. 
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Findings from stratified analysis illustrate that sponsor type (bank, developer, and 
others) matters. Most of our earlier findings for the entire sample are driven by developer 
sponsors. This confirms the capacity of developer sponsors to enhance firm value and operating 
performance, either with their real estate expertise or their pipeline property support. Better 
investment opportunities surrounding developer sponsors could explain why committed 
developer sponsors prefer to pay out fewer dividends and retain cash for future growth 
opportunities. Finally, the presence of alternative governance mechanisms has a weak effect in 
monitoring sponsors and mitigating agency concerns. Only institutional investors have a robust 
effect in enhancing firm value and reducing dividend yield.  
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Figure 1: Typical management structure in Asian REITs 
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Figure 2: Sponsor shareholdings and REIT age 
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Figure 3: Distribution of sponsor shareholdings in Asian and US REITs 
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Table 1: Variable description 
Variable Name Definition 
Tobin's Q 
Market value of equity plus market value of preferred stock plus book 
value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets 
DIVYIELD Dividends per share divided by price per share 
DIVPAY Total common dividends divided by net income 
SPOWN 
Total common equity held by sponsors as a fraction of total common 
equity outstanding 
SPOWN_SQ Square of SPOWN 
INSTIOWN 
Total common equity held by institutional investors as a fraction of 
total common equity outstanding 
BLOCKOWN 
Total common equity held by external shareholders with shareholdings 
of more than 5% as a fraction of total common equity outstanding 
OUTBOD 
Number of outside directors expressed as a percentage of total board 
size 
BODSize Natural logarithm of the size of the board 
Leverage Book value of debt divided by book value of asset 
REITAge Duration from IPO dates (in years) 
ROA Ratio of operating income to total assets 
FFO/TotalAsset Ratio of funds from operations scaled by total assets 
Size Natural logarithm of the market capitalization 
Size_SQ Square of Size 
Sigma 
Annualized standard deviation of stock return calculated using past 
one-year trading data 
AssetGrowth Change in the size of the total asset from time t+1 
FFO(t-1) Lagged funds from operation at t-1 
ChangeFFO Change in FFO from t-1 
Instruments   
Dev_SP Dummy variable equal to 1 if main Sponsor is a developer 
Bank_SP Dummy variable equal to 1 if main Sponsor is a bank 
GLC_SP Dummy variable equal to 1 if Sponsor is government linked  
SPAge Natural logarithm of the Sponsor Age (calculated from founding date) 
SPList Dummy variable equal to 1 if Sponsor is listed in stock exchange 
LN_Spinoffs Natural logarithm of the total number of spinoffs by Sponsor 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in this empirical study. See Table 1 for definitions of all the variables. 
 
Sample N Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Full 716 0.230 0.160 0.990 0.360 0.049 0.046 0.068 0.047 0.710 0.320
Country
HK-REIT 56 0.330 0.160 0.820 0.150 0.030 0.015 0.066 0.050 0.380 0.210
J-REIT 403 0.160 0.110 1.050 0.440 0.054 0.059 0.064 0.046 0.890 0.230
M-REIT 64 0.520 0.170 0.970 0.150 0.062 0.024 0.067 0.028 0.580 0.270
S-REIT 193 0.280 0.120 0.910 0.230 0.041 0.012 0.078 0.052 0.460 0.250
Sponsor Type
Bank 174 0.150 0.090 1.050 0.270 0.049 0.026 0.061 0.049 0.880 0.240
Developers 485 0.270 0.170 0.980 0.390 0.050 0.053 0.069 0.043 0.660 0.320
Others 57 0.200 0.190 0.850 0.260 0.043 0.027 0.083 0.068 0.590 0.330
Panel A
SPOWN Tobin's Q FFO/TA DIVYIELD DIVPAYOUT
   28 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev
Sponsor Characteristics 
% Dev_SP 68.0%
% Bank_SP 24.0%
% GLC_SP 15.0%
% SPList 77.0%
# of Spinoffs 1.74 1.14
SPAge 48.31 37.64
Alternate Governance
% BLOCKOWN 10.0% 12.0%
% INSTIOWN 28.0% 17.0%
BODSize 5.39 2.34
% OUTBOD 58.0% 14.0%
Leverage 43.0% 14.0%
Firm Characteristics 
Size 7.19 1.11
Sigma 10.4% 13.9%
ROA 4.0% 5.0%
AssetGrowth 8.0% 22.0%
REITAge 3.87 2.24
% Diversified 20.0%
% Hotel 4.0%
% Industrial 11.0%
% Office 29.0%
% Residential 13.0%
% Specialty 3.0%
% Retail 20.0%
Panel B
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Table 3: Tobin’s q and sponsor ownership  
The table shows the results of regressions that examine the relationship between Tobin's Q and sponsor 
ownership (SPOWN) for overall sample and sub-samples based on sponsor type. Sector dummies (Industrial, 
Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office, and Diversified sector controls) and time dummies are included in each 
estimation but are not reported. Other independent variables are defined in Table 1.  Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
Variables
SPOWN 0.894 *** 1.140 * 0.697 **
(2.71) (1.88) (2.02)
SPOWNsq -0.894 * -3.233 *** -0.581
(-1.78) (-2.61) (-1.09)
INSTIOWN 0.516 *** 0.185 0.422 **
(3.24) (0.87) (2.57)
BLOCKOWN -0.011 0.057 0.027
(-0.07) (0.22) (0.14)
OUTBOD 0.158 0.128 0.024
(1.41) (0.35) (0.16)
BODSize 0.070 0.079 0.035
(1.33) (1.01) (0.42)
Leverage 0.298 0.128 0.246
(0.80) (0.84) (0.45)
REITAge 0.127 *** 0.082 * 0.116 ***
(5.08) (1.73) (3.91)
Size -0.730 ** -0.171 -1.281 **
(-2.10) (-0.65) (-2.39)
SizeSQ 0.041 * 0.015 0.077 **
(1.95) (0.88) (2.27)
Sigma -0.977 ** -7.289 *** -0.467
(-2.50) (-4.08) (-1.08)
FFO_TotalAssets -0.211 -0.695 -0.221
(-0.82) (-1.40) (-0.74)
AssetGrowth -0.117 -0.055 -0.213
(-1.51) (-1.38) (-1.44)
Japan 0.129 * 0.306 ** 0.207 *
(1.75) (2.05) (1.81)
Malaysia -0.269 Omitted -0.378 *
(-1.39) (-1.66)
Singapore -0.009 0.202 0.053
(-0.18) (1.08) (0.85)
N 692 171 465
adj. R-sq 0.274 0.708 0.261
DevelopersBankCombined
Tobin's Q
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Table 4: Operating performance and sponsor ownership  
The table shows the results of regressions that examine the relationship between operating performance and 
sponsor ownership (SPOWN) for the overall sample and sub-samples based on sponsor type. Sector dummies 
(Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office, and Diversified sector controls) and time dummies are included in 
each estimation but are not reported. Other independent variables are defined in Table 1.  Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Variables
SPOWN 0.134 ** 0.152 0.192 ***
(2.43) (1.47) (2.65)
SPOWNsq -0.172 ** -0.300 -0.249 **
(-2.32) (-1.51) (-2.52)
INSTIOWN 0.002 -0.017 -0.013
(0.21) (-0.55) (-1.13)
BLOCKOWN 0.031 ** 0.038 0.041 *
(2.09) (1.50) (1.96)
OUTBOD 0.007 0.008 -0.024
(0.53) (0.20) (-1.07)
BODSize -0.010 -0.003 -0.011
(-1.27) (-0.46) (-1.10)
Leverage -0.012 -0.004 -0.007
(-1.10) (-0.15) (-0.47)
REITAge 0.010 *** 0.006 0.009 ***
(3.05) (1.15) (2.81)
Size -0.023 -0.223 *** -0.006
(-1.44) (-3.16) (-0.24)
SizeSQ 0.001 0.014 *** 0.000
(1.25) (3.16) (0.14)
Sigma -0.006 -0.050 0.042
(-0.12) (-0.15) (0.93)
AssetGrowth 0.023 0.017 0.041
(1.30) (1.33) (1.03)
Japan 0.012 * -0.006 0.034 ***
(1.71) (-0.42) (3.90)
Malaysia 0.011 Omitted 0.033
(1.20) (3.05) ***
Singapore -0.002 -0.046 ** 0.007
(-0.27) (-2.07) (1.27)
N 692 171 465
adj. R-sq 0.068 0.378 0.08
DevelopersBankCombined
FFO scaled by total assets
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Table 5: Dividend policy and sponsor ownership  
The table summarizes the regression results among dividend yield, dividend payout, and sponsor ownership for 
the overall sample and for the sample stratified according to sponsor type (Bank and Developer). Sector 
dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office, and Diversified sector controls), time dummies, and 
country dummies (Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore) are also included in each estimation but are not reported. 
Other independent variables are defined in Table 1.   Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
Variables
SPOWN -0.093 *** -0.119 -0.059 -0.030 0.535 -0.260
(-2.82) (-1.02) (-1.43) (-0.12) (0.83) (-0.82)
SPOWNsq 0.078 * -0.003 0.060 -0.215 -1.797 0.155
(1.69) (-0.01) (1.08) (-0.56) (-1.26) (0.33)
INSTIOWN -0.056 *** -0.146 *** -0.029 * 0.054 0.054 -0.021
(-3.84) (-2.65) (-1.92) (0.57) (0.20) (-0.16)
BLOCKOWN 0.051 ** 0.107 ** 0.088 *** -0.315 ** -0.361 0.046
(2.15) (2.06) (2.91) (-2.12) (-0.69) (0.27)
OUTBOD -0.009 -0.021 -0.016 0.179 0.020 0.156
(-0.56) (-0.51) (-0.81) (1.63) (0.09) (0.94)
BODSize -0.025 *** -0.016 -0.037 *** 0.003 -0.120 * 0.141 **
(-3.30) (-1.26) (-4.39) (0.07) (-1.96) (2.20)
Leverage 0.002 0.014 -0.022 -0.374 *** -0.634 *** -0.490 ***
(0.14) (0.60) (-1.27) (-4.56) (-2.86) (-5.73)
ChangeFFO 0.003 -0.423 * 0.025 -0.387 -0.974 -0.347
(0.10) (-1.98) (0.95) (-1.63) (-0.77) (-1.51)
FFO(t-1) 0.051 0.256 0.005 -0.744 *** 0.098 -0.854 ***
(0.89) (1.00) (0.14) (-3.69) (0.10) (-3.82)
Size -0.056 *** -0.023 -0.045 * 0.311 ** 0.502 0.585 ***
(-2.84) (-0.33) (-1.92) (2.50) (1.38) (3.16)
SizeSQ 0.003 *** 0.002 0.003 * -0.022 *** -0.036 -0.039 ***
(2.61) (0.37) (1.86) (-2.70) (-1.53) (-3.29)
ROA 0.005 -0.083 0.006 -1.032 *** 0.163 -0.990 ***
(0.12) (-0.48) (0.18) (-3.07) (0.17) (-2.76)
TobinsQ -0.030 *** -0.062 *** -0.026 *** 0.069 *** 0.159 * 0.081 ***
(-4.95) (-3.64) (-4.97) (2.99) (1.97) (2.75)
Japan -0.018 * -0.020 -0.021 * 0.499 *** 0.453 *** 0.580 ***
(-1.89) (-0.73) (-1.87) (9.07) (3.70) (7.88)
Malaysia -0.026 ** Omitted -0.020 0.315 *** Omitted 0.399 ***
(-2.24) (-1.56) (3.89) (4.08)
Singapore 0.013 ** 0.040 0.001 0.094 *** 0.200 0.022
(2.40) (1.32) (0.17) (2.70) (1.14) (0.49)
N 575 157 383 574 157 382
adj. R-sq 0.438 0.663 0.386 0.562 0.585 0.576
BankDevelopersBankCombined
Dividend Yield Dividend Payout
Combined Developers
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Table 6: Two-stage least squares estimation 
The table shows the results of the two-stage least squares estimations among sponsor ownership, Tobin's Q, 
FFO/TotalAsset, and Dividend distribution (Dividend Yield, Dividend Payout). Instrument variables for 
endogenous variables (SPOWN and SPOWNsq) are GLC_SP, Bank_SP, Dev_SP, SPAge, SPList, and 
LN_Spinoffs. Definitions for instruments and other independent variables are provided in Table 1. Sector 
dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office, and Diversified sector controls), time dummies, and 
country dummies (Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore) are also included in each estimation but are not reported. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Variables
SPOWN 6.971 ** 0.078 -0.961 * 3.515
(2.28) (0.23) (-1.79) (1.45)
SPOWNsq -10.570 ** 0.314 1.850 * -6.337
(-2.08) (0.48) (1.79) (-1.36)
INSTIOWN 0.729 *** 0.023 -0.064 ** 0.179
(3.26) (1.39) (-2.09) (1.24)
BLOCKOWN -0.125 0.083 ** 0.068 -0.337 *
(-0.43) (2.18) (1.49) (-1.82)
OUTBOD -0.137 0.024 0.047 -0.000
(-0.52) (0.88) (1.17) (-0.00)
BODSize 0.073 -0.002 -0.016 -0.003
(0.99) (-0.20) (-1.16) (-0.05)
Leverage -0.042 0.022 0.057 -0.513 ***
(-0.07) (0.52) (1.17) (-2.85)
REITAge 0.202 *** 0.015 ***
(4.10) (2.98)
Size -0.793 ** -0.096 *** -0.057 0.120
(-2.10) (-2.67) (-1.00) (0.46)
SizeSQ 0.047 ** 0.006 *** 0.003 -0.007
(1.99) (2.67) (0.73) (-0.40)
Sigma -2.536 ** 0.032
(-2.45) (0.28)
FFO_TotalAssets -0.947 **
(-2.01)
AssetGrowth -0.013 0.022
(-0.12) (1.32)
ROA 0.005 -1.064 **
(0.07) (-2.54)
TobinsQ -0.022 ** 0.024
(-2.00) (0.64)
ChangeFFO 0.010 -0.436
(0.20) (-1.30)
FFO(t-1) 0.118 -1.068 ***
(1.52) (-3.27)
N 692 692 575 574
adj. R-sq 0.438 0.663 0.386 0.386
Dividend YieldFFO/TotalAssetsTobinsQ
2SLS
Dividend Payout
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Appendix A 
REIT Name Country Type Details Outcome 
Fortune REIT Hong Kong RPTs 
Fortune REIT proposed an acquisition of three 
properties from its sponsor, Cheung Kong. 
Fortune REIT planned to fund this acquisition 
by a rights issue of HKD 1.9 billion. At the point 
of acquisition, Cheung Kong is a significant 
shareholder of Fortune REIT holding almost 
40% of the shares. The proposed transaction was 
unfavorable for Fortune REIT, as the net asset 
value per share would fall from $7.5 to $4.8 and 
the distribution yield would decrease from 9% to 
7.2%. Fortune REIT was overpaying for these 
acquisitions as the non-prime properties were 
valued at overly optimistic yields. 
 
On the day of acquisition, 
Fortune REIT lost about 10% 
of its share value due to 
excessive dumping of shares 
by investors. 
FC Residential  
Investment 
Corporation 
Japan Financing 
FC Residential REIT announced that it would 
acquire properties from its sponsors. Ichigo 
group intended to finance the acquisitions via 
private placements. Units would be issued into a 
special-purpose vehicle affiliated with the 
sponsor at a price of 180,000 yen, which was 
approximately 25% below the closing traded 
price and a 61% discount to its book value.  
 
Several investors requested to 
suspend the proposed property 
transaction, which was highly 
disadvantageous to existing 
shareholders. The REIT was 
forced to suspend this 
transaction. 
Keppeland REIT Singapore RPTs 
K-REIT proposed to sell Keppel Towers and GE 
Towers at $573 million to its sponsor, Keppel 
Land, while using those proceeds to purchase 
87.5% stake of Ocean Financial Center at $2.01 
billion from Keppel Land. Questions were raised 
about the price paid by K-REIT for the 
acquisition of Ocean Financial Center as it was 
K-REIT lost approximately 
10% of its share value on the 
day of announcing the asset 
swap. 
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very much overvalued as compared to recent 
transacted prices.  
 
Mori Hills REIT Japan 
RPTs 
Financing 
Mori Hills REIT announced that it would 
acquire two properties from its sponsor, Mori 
Hill Building Co. and sell one of the properties 
back to its sponsor. This acquisition would be 
funded by private placement in which the 
sponsor would receive new units at 500,000 yen. 
This offering price was approximately 33% 
lower than the IPO price and a 13% discount 
from book value per share. In addition, Mori Hill 
was overpaying for the RPT as the transaction 
price was much higher than the appraised value. 
As a result of this transaction, sponsor 
ownership increased from 15% to 30%. 
 
Mori Hill REIT managed to 
execute the transaction 
without investor intervention. 
The management indicated 
that the distribution per unit 
would not be affected by 
optimistic rental projections. 
Macarthurcook 
REIT 
Singapore Financing  
Macarthurcook Investment REIT (MI-REIT) 
faced difficulties in refinancing its expiring 
debts due to the subprime credit crisis in 2009.  
Around the same time, AIMS financial group 
acquired Macarthurcook Group (MI-REIT's 
sponsor). Cambridge Industrial Trust (CIT) 
proposed the acquisition of MI-REIT to bail it 
out from its refinancing crisis. However, AIMS 
Financial Group (the sponsor) was reluctant to 
sell to CIT and instead chose to recapitalize.  
New share units raised from the recapitalization 
would constitute 85% of the total units 
outstanding. 
 
Severe dilution of the share 
value of existing unit holders 
occurred because of the 
reluctance of sponsors to 
divest the REIT. The 
recapitalization caused the 
share price to decline by more 
than 50%. Shareholders have 
no specific provisions to 
impose control on the severe 
dilution. 
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Appendix B: Summary of collinearity diagnostic 
 
 
  
SQRT R-
Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared
SPOWN 1.49 1.22 0.67 0.33
INSTIOWN 2.11 1.45 0.48 0.52
OUTBOD 1.62 1.27 0.62 0.38
BODSize 1.42 1.19 0.71 0.29
Leverage 1.31 1.15 0.77 0.23
REITAge 1.54 1.24 0.65 0.35
Size 1.79 1.34 0.57 0.43
Sigma 1.03 1.02 0.99 0.01
FFO/TotalAsset 1.56 1.25 0.64 0.36
AssetT 1.12 1.06 0.90 0.10
ChangeFFO 1.50 1.22 0.67 0.33
Tobin's Q 1.09 1.04 0.92 0.08
Mean VIF 1.46
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Appendix C: Dividend payout model with different estimation methods 
The table summarizes the regression results between dividend payout and sponsor ownership for the overall 
sample, as an example model, using three different estimation methods: pooled OLS with heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors, random-effect flexible generalized least squares (FGLS) with cluster-robust standard 
errors, and fixed-effect least-squares dummy-variables regression (LSDV) with cluster-robust standard errors. 
All relevant control variables are included in each estimation but are not reported. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables
SPOWN -0.093 *** -0.121 *** -0.125 ***
(-2.82) (-3.17) (-3.17)
SPOWNsq 0.078 * 0.123 ** 0.178 **
(1.69) (2.30) (2.22)
N 575 575 575
adj. R-sq 0.438 0.454 0.276
Fixed-effect LSDVRandom-effect FGLSPooled OLS
Dividend Payout model
